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ELMINATING "SUBJECT-TO" AUDIT QUALIFICATION,
CONTRADITORY STANDARDS, AND
ASSESSMENT OF RISK
Abstract
Sixty-four experienced Canadian bank loan officers participated in
two experiments that aimed at evaluating the effects on assessment of
risk of the "subject to" audit qualification. Each experiment required
a sequence of judgments about long term loans to each of three com-
panies. Judgments were requested over a (simulated) period of three
years. The research design permitted manipulating the nature of con-
tingencies, the combination of contingency disclosure and audit quali-
fication, the resolution of those contingencies, and the presence of
contradictory standards between the U.S. and Canada for cross listed
companies.
The findings (using ANOVA and multiple comparisons) are consistent
with the hypothesis that the existence (or absence) of disclosed con-
tingency, not the "subject to" audit qualification, is the primary
influencing factor in the assessment of risk by bank loan officers.
Furthermore, the findings indicate that bankers assign a lower weight
to the audit opinion (as a source of uncertainty assessment) than to
analysis of profitability, liquidity and solvency using the company's
financial history. Finally, while the AICPA continues to debate its
merits, Canadian bankers have adapted to the elimination of the
"subject to" audit qualification by becoming more inquisitive about
footnote disclosures.

ELIMINATING "SUBJECT-TO" AUDIT QUALIFICATION,
CONTRADICTORY STANDARDS, AND ASSESSMENT OF RISK
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we report the findings of two experiments concerning
the effects of different standards for reporting loss contingencies on
bankers' assessment of the riskiness of corporate borrowers. The sub-
jects in both experiments were 64 commercial bank loan officers employed
in seven large banks located in Canada. This setting was chosen
because the subject-to qualification was eliminated in Canada as of
September 1980. Each experiment required a series of judgments over a
(simulated) time of three years for each of three different companies.
Specifically, the loan officers were asked to examine the financial
performance of each company in the preceding period(s) and make judg-
ments about:
(i) the level of each company's debt-paying ability,
(ii) the interest rate premium above the prime rate to be charged
to each company, and
(iii) the probability of default.
Using three companies and three years of simulated time in each
experiment provided the opportunity to vary the following factors:
(a) The nature of the contingency, if any, reported by the company, and
(b) The audit report, as to whether it is an unqualified, a qualified,
.. ,
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or a split opinion.
The results indicate that the Canadian bankers' assessments of
uncertainty were influenced more by the existence of loss contingencies
than by the subject-to qualification of the audit report. This find-
ing is generally consistent with Libby (1979). Differences in research
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design between this and other studies, the use of various factor com-
binations, and carefully controlling for the sequence of information
flows to each subject distinguishes this study from the extant litera-
ture.
II. BACKGROUND
The Issues
Present accounting standards (FASB Statement No. 5) require the
disclosure of a material expected loss that might result from a con-
tingency as long as the realization of that loss is at least reasonably
"probable." Similarly, U.S. auditing standards require that a
qualified subject-to (or disclaimer) report be issued in such a circum-
2
stance. Issuing a qualified opinion in those situations was viewed
unfavorably by the Commission on Auditor's Responsibility (1978, pp.
25-28) which saw a conflict between the auditor's role in expressing
opinion on the fairness of presentation and reporting on uncertainty;
the auditor would be both a reporter and an interpreter of financial
information. The Commission emphasized that the need to single out for
inclusion in the auditor's report the contingencies for which adequate
disclosure is made by the management creates both confusion in the
3
minds of users, and false expectations. As Anderson (1977, p. 517)
pointed out, "[A] 11 business enterprises are subject to various types
and degrees of uncertainty. The segregation of a particular set of
uncertainties as requiring 'subject to' qualifications is bound to be
somewhat arbitrary."
In response to the strong opposition to the "subject-to" qualifi-
cation, the AICPA has twice proposed its elimination in October, 1977
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and in March, 1982. At a subsequent hearing, a number of arguments
were advanced in favor of the "subject-to" including the idea that it
serves as a "red flag" directing users to probe further into the matter
mentioned in the auditors' report. It was also reported that "Some
users believed that auditors have inside information in addition to
what is disclosed in the financial statements and that 'subject-to' can
be used by them to tip the reader off to that fact..." (Forbes , August
16, 1982, p. 92). In commenting on the meeting, Carmichael (1982)
expressed surprise at the "Apparent agreement among users, particularly
analysts, that the "subject-to" was a useful tool for analysis."
However, the arguments put forth were strong enough to effectively
block passage of the proposal.
Unlike the AICPA, the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
(the CICA) reasoned that GAAP includes a requirement for adequate
disclosure. In 1980, the CICA concluded:
"If the auditor has obtained sufficient appropriate
audit evidence to determine that, in his opinion,
the accounting treatment, disclosure and presenta-
tion of a contingency are in accordance with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles, he should not
express a reservation (subject to) of opinion nor
otherwise refer to the contingency in his report."
(CICA Handbook, Sec. 5510.49.)
In addition, the CICA issued (in April, 1981) an Accounting
Guideline that applies when a Canadian auditor is reporting on a
Canadian company that also submits audited financial statements to the
SEC in the U.S. If U.S. auditing standards differ, an explanatory com-
ment is required for the U.S. readers. The comment is not part of the
auditor's Canadian report and is identified to the U.S. readers as a
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result of the contradiction in auditing standards. Such a report is
what we refer to as a "split opinion" (see the Appendix).
The Research Problem
The research problem of interest in this study is whether signifi-
cant decision-effects emanate from providing "subject to" qualifica-
tion in audit reports in addition to management's disclosure of con-
tingencies. To the extent that auditors must "authenticate" the
quality of all management's footnote disclosure, issuing a "subject to"
qualification might be perceived to be caused by either deficient foot-
note disclosure, or, auditor disagreement with the management's
assessment of the degree of uncertainty. Such a perception charac-
terized the opinions of users of financial statements who attended the
AICPA conference (see Forbes
,
1982). Their comments imply attributing
higher risk to a company whose audit report has been qualified for
uncertainty relative to an identical situation in which the qualifica-
tion is absent.
This is essentially the hypothesis that had been investigated by a
series of studies (Shank et al., 1978, 1979; Reckers and Gromling,
1979; Libby, 1979; Banks and Kinney, 1982; Hicks, 1982; Muchler, 1984,
and Richardson, 1982). In the Libby study, thirty-six bankers were the
subjects in an experiment carried out by mail. The objective was to
evaluate the extent to which bank loan officers evaluate uncertainty,
depending upon the type of contingency communication. The conditions
included supplemental information prepared by the company's legal coun-
. attesting to the validity of the claim against the company. Libby
concluded that the qualification of audit opinion, did not influence
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banker's assessment of risk. That finding was challenged by Berthold
(1979) and Schultz (1979) on various grounds concerning their eva-
luation of the study's internal validity. Libby, however, suggested
the need for further research on the initial formation of "hypotheses
which affects the nature of uncertainty workup," and, on the weight
given to the audit qualification. This study serves as an extension of
Libby's work in which some of these issues and the concerns of its
4
critics were considered in the research design and implementation.
III. RESEARCH METHOD
The approach adopted is a pre-test, post-test with controls. Each
experiment consisted of making repeated judgments about three com-
panies. Those judgments were to be made over a simulated period of
three years. The experimental treatments consisted of manipulating the
form and type of contingency disclosure and the manner in which the
contingencies were resolved. More discussion of the research design
follows.
1. The Task
In each experiment, the task consisted of making an unsecured-term
loan to three different and unrelated companies. After having recorded
their assessment of debt paying ability, loan officers were requested
to make judgments about the interest rate premium (above the prime
rate) that would be charged on each loan. The interest rate premium
was to be adjustable annually (with the use of new information) in
accordance with bankers' re-evaluation of each company's debt-paying
ability and assessment of the probability of default. These judgments
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were conditional on the additional information provided by financial
performance and by the various audit opinions. Each experiment, there-
fore, consisted of a simulated time sequence of three fiscal periods in
which consecutive judgments were made based on sequential analysis of
information for each successive year.
2. Subjects and Task Performance
Canadian commercial bank loan officers were chosen for several
reasons. For one thing, in August 1980, the CICA eliminated the
subject-to qualification for contingencies. Hence, including that
situation in the experiment is not as hypothetical for Canadian as it
would be for American bankers. Moreover, one of the experimental
manipulations ("split" audit opinion) consists of an audit opinion that
is qualified for U.S. stockholders only. This unusual type of report
only affects Canadian companies that are required to submit financial
statements to the SEC in the U.S. Since the Canadian companies borrow
in Canadian capital markets, split audit opinions are not new to
Canadian bank loan officers. The situation is, of course, different
for U.S. bankers; they have not encountered such an opinion as part of
a loan application since SAS continue to require the "subject to"
qualification.
A total of 66 commercial bank loan officers participated in this
study. Initial contact with subjects was made through a senior vice
president in each of seven large banks in a metropolitan area.
Experience with processing commercial loan applications, including
financial statement analysis, was the only requirement. The average
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experience with actual evaluation of commercial loan applications for
participants was about nine years.
One researcher met with each loan officer to conduct the experiment,
which consumed approximately one hour per officer. The one-on-one
meeting assisted in randomizing the extraneous factors (associated with
the experimental setting, location, interaction between subjects, etc.)
and facilitated sequencing the flow of information to subjects. The
stated objective of the study was to examine the use of accounting
information in making judgments by loan officers. The researcher's
role was to explain the sequence of the experimental material such that
judgments were made in a manner consistent with the simulated fiscal
periods.
The experimental judgments made by two participants were considered
invalid because of lack of internal consistency of their judgments. Of
the 64 valid experimental participants, 33 were in the first experiment
and 31 were in the second.
3. Design
The three hypothetical companies (denoted ABC, LMN, and XYZ ) in the
study are based on information about three actual corporations. The
background information provided in the experimental package included a
brief description of the business of each company. The financial state-
ments of the three companies were altered to meet several research
design constraints:
(a) The size of each company was scaled in order to avoid using size
as a variable. After scaling, total assets were $92 (for ABC),
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$86 (for LMN) and $100 (for XYZ) million in the year of granting
the loan,
(b) The financial conditions were re-structured such that there would
be little qualitative discrimination between the three companies at
the initial setting, the point at which bankers formed their priors
about the companies used in the study.
In order to avoid introducing confounding variables, two conditions
were imposed:
1. A_ financial leverage constraint : The levels of debt to equity in
the second and third judgment periods were either equal to or lower
than the levels of that ratio in the first simulation period.
2. Profitability constraint : The ratio of net income to sales was kept
at 0.02 throughout the study.
The combined effect of both conditions is that, other than the un-
certainty generated by the contingencies, the financial conditions of
the three companies had relatively improved over time.
Exhibit 1 presents the basic research design of the two experiments
with respect to the manipulated independent variables (contingencies and
audit opinions) for the three companies and for the three simulated years
,
Insert Exhibit 1 here
As shown in Exhibit 1, the information presented to subjects about
the three companies varied between the two experiments (in years 2 and
3). A discussion of the research design is presented below for each
experiment separately, after a brief listing of the elements common to
both.
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Exhibit 1
Basic Research Design of the Two Experiments
for the Three Companies and the Three Simulated
Decision Periods
Experiment Company
Simulated Judgment Period
Year 1 Year 2* Year 3*
(1) ABC Clean opinion
No contingency
Qualified opinion
Tax assessment
Clean opinion
Tax assessment
LMN Clean opinion
No contingency
Clean opinion
No contingency
Clean opinion
No contingency
XYZ Clean opinion
No contingency
Qualified opinion
Litigation
Clean opinion
Litigation settled
(2) ABC Clean opinion
No contingency
Clean opinion
Tax assessment
Clean opinion
Tax assessment
LMN Clean opinion
No contingency
Clean opinion
No contingency
Clean opinion
No contingency
XYZ Clean opinion
No contingency
Split opinion**
Litigation
Clean opinion
Litigation settled
*Note: In all cases, a company's financial position changed over time but
the following constraints apply:
(1) Net income to sales — remained the same
(2) Net income to net worth — improved in subsequent years over Year 1
(3) Long term debt to net worth — either remained the same or improved
over time
**Split opinion refers to the case where Canadian stockholders get a clean
opinion that is followed by a paragraph containing a subject-to qualification
for the U.S. stockholders.
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Essential Features:
The essential differences between the two experiments concern the
information provided in the second year and the consequences of the
different information treatments. In terms of the effects on findings,
the structure of the second year information between the two experi-
ments should assist in
(1) comparing judgments made about ABC company under two states:
(a) contingency disclosure and qualified audit report, versus (b)
contingency disclosure, but the subject-to qualification was not
required;
(2) comparing judgments about XYZ company under two states: (a)
contingency disclosure and a "standard" audit qualification, versus (b)
contingency disclosure and a "split" audit report;
and (3) comparing judgments in the third year when the resolution
of those contingencies was conditioned on these different states that
prevailed in the second year.
(1) Elements Common in Both Experiments
The experimental booklets of each company in both experiments con-
tained the following information.
(1.1) Introductory statements concerning background information about
each of the companies, the objective of the study and the types
of decisions that need to be made.
(1.2) Bank loan officers in the two experiments received the same in-
formation about ABC, LMN, and XYZ in the first simulated period,
the period in which an unsecured four-year loan was made to each
of the three companies. The information consisted of summarized
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financial reports and financial ratios for the preceding three
years for each company. The financial ratios were those used
by one of the banks (see Appendix). The financial statements of
each company included a summarized set of footnotes and an audit
opinion covering the most recent year (and the preceding year by
reference). No contingencies were reported and all received
unqualified audit opinions in the first period. The same set of
financial statements and the accompanying information for year
one was used in both experiments. Hence, the information base
used in forming initial judgments about each of the three com-
panies did not differ between the two experiments.
(1.3) The information about company LMN was the same for both experi-
ments; a "no contingency" status was maintained.
(1.4) At the end of each experiment, each subject completed a de-
briefing questionnaire, which followed the last decision sequence
of the study. In particular the participants were asked to
provide various demographic information, to state their views
about the experimental packages and to allocate weights to
several factors, including the audit opinion, in terms of their
significance in loan evaluation.
(2) Elements That are Unique to Each Experiment
In years two and three, loan officers were asked to consider new
information about the financial performance of the three companies in
(i) re-evaluating the debt-paying ability of each company, (ii) revising
the interest premium to be charged above the prime rate, and (iii) esti-
mating the probability of default on the loan. In connection with the
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experimental manipulation, the two experiments differed by (1) the nature
of contingency, and (2) the form of audit report on that contingency for
companies ABC and XYZ. Otherwise, the financial condition of the com-
panies were identical in both experiments. The discussion that follows
elaborates on the particulars of each experiment.
(2.1) The First Experiment (X=l)
In the second sequence of the judgment process, bank loan officers
were provided a package consisting of the financial statements of the
preceding three years (i.e., simulated year one of the experiment, plus
the two previous years), footnotes, financial ratios, and audit opinions.
The experimental manipulation consisted of providing two different types
of contingencies—a claim by Revenue Canada (IRS equivalent) for back
taxes assessed against ABC, and litigation against XYZ company by a
customer for alleged non-performance on a contract. LMN reported no
contingencies. The uncertainties about the merit of the claims
reflected in the two types of contingencies for ABC and XYZ resulted in
subject-to opinions about the financial statements for year two. The
stated contingent claims were approximately equal to the net operating
cash flows generated by the companies during that year.
In the third year, it was assumed that the requirement to render a
subject-to qualification was no longer in effect. The income tax con-
tingency of the ABC company was disclosed in a footnote to the financial
statements, but the auditor's report was not qualified. XYZ company
disclosed that it had settled its client's claim by committing to make
certain repairs at a much lower amount than had been claimed. The esti-
mated cost of repair was accrued as a liability and the auditors did not
have to qualify their opinion.
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(2.2) The Second Experiment (X=2)
In this experiment, the subject-to qualification was assumed to be
eliminated in year two rather than year three as was the case in experi-
ment one. The financial statements and footnotes were the same in both
experiments. Although the same contingencies existed, the audit reports
were different. ABC received a clean opinion. As disclosed in the
background information furnished to the participants, because XYZ com-
pany was listed on both the Toronto and the American Stock Exchanges,
it received a "split opinion." The remaining components of the
research design were identical to those in the first experiment.
IV. EXPECTATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
Given the research design of the two experiments discussed above,
the general objective of evaluating decision-effects was operation-
alized by specifying several testable hypotheses. In order to place
these hypotheses in context, consider the following points:
(i) Grouping of companies
Bankers were asked to make judgments about three companies (ABC,
LMN, XYZ) in each decision sequence. Consequently, a banker's judgment
about each company was made on the basis of three years of information:
the company specific information, and the relative standing of the com-
pany by comparison to others in the same package. Specifically, the
more favorable a company looked by comparison with others in the same
package, the lower should be the bankers' estimation (on average) of
its risk. Two approaches are used for considering this conditional
nature of the data base. The first approach assumes that the three
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companies in a package constitute a portfolio of loans— the "portfolio"
approach. The second approach considers the judgments made about each
company to be separate from those made about others—the "individual"
approach.
(ii) Bankers [ own judgment models
-The models that individual bankers used in making the judgments
called for in these experiments are not explicitly specifiable. If
different loan officers used different decision models, their judgments
would differ throughout the study. Thus, using these judgments in a
cross sectional analysis without some transformation will not allow for
discriminating between model differences and the effects of the manipu-
lated (experimental) variables. The transformation employed consists
of using the initial judgment made by each individual as standards
against which subsequent judgments made by the same individual are
compared. Given that the experimental material was completed by each
subject within a time span of approximately an hour, it can be safely
assumed that the decision heuristic of a given individual banker was
stationary throughout the study. Hence, changes in each bank loan
officer's judgment in the two subsequent decision periods from the ini-
tial judgment (the standard) can be attributed to two factors: decline
in time to maturity, and the different information cues presented.
(iii) Measurement scales
Judgments about debt-paying ability (DPA) and the probability of
default (PD) were elicited on pre-determined variable interval scales,
while judgments on interest rate premiums (IP) were made on a scale
that is incremented by 1/4 percent. Accordingly, only categorical
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analysis can be used for DPA and PD, while both categorical and para-
metric analysis can be used in the analysis of the interest rate pre-
mium since bankers' evaluation of the effects of the changes in each
company's risk on IP was recorded on ratio scale.
Hypotheses about interest rate premiums (IP)
In each of the three simulated years, each banker made judgments
about the interest rate premium (IP) to be charged to each company.
The provision that IP is adjustable once a year required that these
judgments be revised after new information was received. Each banker,
therefore, made three initial judgments about the interest premium and
six subseauent revisions. Testing hypotheses about those judgments
will utilize ANOVA and pairwise t-tests.
For the purpose of this analysis, we define the following terms:
IP
v
= the interest rate premium charged by banker j to company
C in the simulated decision year Y.
C = the company: ABC, LMN, or XYZ
.
j = bankers, where the first 33 are in the first experiment
and the remaining 31 are in the second experiment.
DIP = the difference between IP for the second year and that
of the first year (Y=2), and between IP of the third
year and that of the first year (Y=3).
The DIP measures, therefore, reflect changes in the judgment of
each banker about the interest rate premium charged to each company
after the receipt of new information about that company. As indicated
earlier, certain items of the information presented varied between
simulated periods and between experiments as shown in Exhibit 1. As
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can be seen, for the first experiment, second year decisions represent
the effects of more signals about uncertainty than in the third year.
Except for the format (uncertainty signals in the form of a footnote
for ABC and a split opinion for XYZ), the same was true for the second
experiment. Accordingly, the two years in which bankers revised their
judgments (Y=2, and Y=3) can be used as surrogates for the information
about uncertainty, with year two containing more signals about uncer-
tainty than year three. Accordingly, the index Y will be used in the
analysis of variance that follows to represent the information signals.
Profitability and leverage ratios started at equivalent levels for
all three companies in both experiments and were maintained at either
stable or improved levels during the simulated three year period. More-
over, the loans were structured as four-year (unsecured) term loans
with the principal due at maturity and interest paid annually. Under
these conditions, and ceteris paribus, the closer the term loan is to
maturity, the lower the risk of default on the loan. Accordingly, the
absence of "bad news" (during years of stable profits and leverage)
implies a lower risk of default as time to maturity decreases. That
is, average DIP \ 0; the interest rate premiums charged in the second
and third years should not be higher than those charged in the first
year. Thus, obtaining DIP > could only result from adverse evalua-
tion of the information provided in the (simulated) periods subsequent
to that of the initial decision. The hypotheses development that
follows will be discussed at two levels: the portfolio of companies in
the same package, and the individual company level.
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The Loan Portfolio Approach:
In each experiment bankers made their judgments about all three
companies at the same time, it can be assumed that each banker ranked
the three companies before making judgments about the interest rates to
be charged. Under these circumstances, analysis of the three companies
as a combined judgment (the "portfolio" approach) reduces the judgment
variations resulting from this conditional judgment on individual
companies). These relationships can be examined by two ANOVA models.
The first is a 2x3 model in which the information factor Y takes on two
levels: information provided in the second year (Y=2) and the infor-
mation provided in the third year (Y=3). The second factor (C) repre-
sents the companies, and takes three levels (for ABC, LMN, and XYZ).
This model (Ml) is to be estimated once for each experiment. The
second ANOVA model (M2) is a 2x3x2 and extends the first model to
include the two experiments as a third factor. These models are pre-
sented as follows:
DIP = M + Y + C + Y*C + u .... (Ml) (for each experiment)
DIP =M+Y+C+Y*C+X+u' (M2) (for both experiments)
where: M is the unconditional mean of the changes in the interest
rate premiums, Y is the information factor representing the nature of
audit qualifications and contingencies reported over the second and
third years, C is the company factor, Y*C is an interaction term, X is
the experiment, and u and u' are error terms with expected value of zero
and variance estimated by S.
The specific hypotheses to be tested here are:
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II(o): Y=C=Y*C=X=0
H(a): Y > 0, for the information levels;
C * 0, for the companies since aside from Y there is no
particular direction to their risk assessment;
Y*C > 0, for the interaction because, in at least one third
of the cases, there were no contingencies to report,
while in others contingencies existed;
X * 0, for the experiment since there is no a priori reason
to expect differences between bankers in both experi-
ments.
Two conditions must be satisfied for the ANOVA models to be appro-
priate. The first is homogeneity of variance, a basic assumption
underlying ANOVA. Various tests (using Cochran C) suggest that such a
condition is satisfied. The second relates to the nature of the priors
formed by bankers in the two experiments at the time the loans were
granted. The absence of a directional hypothesis about the experimen-
tal factor, X, is due to the underlying assumption that bankers par-
ticipating in both experiments were, as groups, not different. Hence,
it becomes important to validate this assumption by examining the con-
sistency of their judgments since both groups received identical infor-
mation in the first simulated year. Also, the initial level of the
interest rate premium is important in that it provides the standard
from which information-induced departures (DIP) are measured.
The Individual Company Hypotheses:
Comparison with the Control Company : LMN was used as control
—
no contingencies were reported. Thus, the increase in interest
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rate premium (DIP) for companies ABC and XYZ in the second year is
expected to be greater than the change in DIP for LMN. If the subject-
to qualification generates decision-effects beyond the footnote dis-
closure, such a relationship would be observed for the first experiment,
but not for the second, and for DIP of ABC in the second, but not in
the third year. Finally, in the third year DIP of XYZ should be sta-
tistically equal to DIP in LMN because XYZ contingency was resolved at
low cost in that year.
These expectations lead to formulating the following hypotheses:
CH : DIP (ABC - LMN) = DIP (XYZ - LMN) - 0, for y = 2.3
y y
CH : DIP (ABC - LMN) > 0, for y = 2,3
a
i y
CH : DIP (XYZ - LMN) > 0, for y = 2,3
a
2 y
The alternative expectations discussed above can be operationalized
as follows:
(i) The subject-to qualification induces significant decision-
effects would be consistent with (1) rejecting the null for DIP(ABC -
LMN) in the first, but not the second experiment and in the second year
only, and (2) rejecting the null for DIP(XYZ - LMN) for both experi-
ments in the second year only.
(ii) The subject-to qualification does not induce any more
decision-effects than contingency footnote disclosure would be consis-
tent with rejecting the null throughout except for DIP(XYZ - LMN) in
the third year when neither company reported any contingency.
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Within Company Coinparisons Across Periods :
Since the experimental manipulation varied between companies and
experiments, several testable hypotheses about DIP are developed. These
hypotheses are grouped in four categories as follows:
Category A : Hypotheses stated in connection with situations having
no contingencies. These are for company LMN in both experiments for
both years two and three, and for XYZ in both experiments for the third
year only.
Category B : Hypotheses related to reporting subject-to qualifica-
tions. These are made in connection with companies ABC and XYZ in the
second year of the first experiment only.
Category C : Hypotheses about the reporting of contingencies which
are not accompanied by qualified audit opinions. These are made in con-
nection with companies ABC in the third year of both experiments, and
in the second year of the second experiment.
Category D : Hypothesis stated about the "split" audit opinion. This
is a single hypothesis about XYZ company in the second year of the second
experiment.
As indicated earlier, certeris paribus, the shorter the time to
maturity, the lower the expected risk of default should be for a term
loan. Consequently, DIP should be equal to or less than zero for Cate-
gory A. The existence of contingencies, however, should increase the
risk of default. Thus, DIP is expected to be significantly greater
than zero for the other three categories. On the other hand, if the
subject-to qualification of audit opinions is an information cue to
which bankers attribute more value than the management disclosure foot-
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note in assessing the risk of default, then DIP should be significantly
positive for Category B, and should be equal to or less than zero for
Category C. In this case, however, no directional expectations can be
determined about the Category D hypothesis because bankers are equally
as likely to consider as to ignore the appended subject-to qualifica-
tion in the "split" opinion. Specific statements of these hypotheses
are presented in Exhibit 2.
Hypotheses about debt paying ability and probability of default
were developed to test the consistency of judgments. Categorical
6
analysis of data was used to test these hypotheses.
Insert Exhibit 2 here
V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The ANOVA results of estimating both Ml and M2 models are presented
in Table 1. In all cases, the effects of the information factor, Y, and
the company factor, C, were statistically significant (at p < 0.05).
The interaction term Y*C was significant when both experiments were com-
bined (using the p < 0.05 level). The experimental factor, X, was mar-
ginally significant (p < 0.06) when M2 was estimated. This level indi-
cates that some differences existed between the two experiments. All the
ANOVA models were statistically significant at p < 0.05.
These findings indicate that bankers adjusted the interest rate
premium significantly in the second and third year over their initial
assessment in the first period. Furthermore, those changes varied
between companies. It is important, therefore, to examine the sources
of differences and the directions of those changes. Duncan Multiple
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Exhibit 2
Individual Company Hypotheses
About the Mean of
Adjustments to Interest Rate Premiums (DIP)
Panel A: Alternative with Company
Hypotheses for
X=l and X=2
DIP in Y=2 DIP in Y=3
Company ABC
LMN
XYZ
(for X=l) Bl: DIP >
(for X=2) CI: DIP >
(for X=l,2) Al: DIP <
(for X=l) B2: DIP >
(for X=2) Dl: DIP >
(for X=l,2) C2: DIP >
(for X=l,2) A2: DIP <
(for X=l,2) A3: DIP <
Panel B: Differences Between
Experiments X=l and
X=2 for Each Company
ABC
LMN
XYZ
dif. DIP >
dif. DIP =
dif. DIP >
dif. DIP -
dif. DIP =
dif. DIP =
Note: Category A: No contingencies and no qualification
Category 3: Contingencies are present and audit opinions
include "subject-to" qualifications
Category C: Contingencies are reported, but audit opinions
are not qualified
Category D: Split opinion (Clean for Canadian Stockholders,
but qualified for the U.S.)
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Range Tests were used for that purpose. The results of the tests are
presented in Table 2.
Insert Tables 1 and 2 here
The test results suggest the following:
1. The significant effect of the information factor, Y, results from
a significant decrease in the interest rate premium (negative DIP)
in the third year as compared to the second year. This is consis-
tent with expectations since, coupled with a shorter term to
maturity, one half of the contingencies that existed in the second
year were cleared in the third year.
2. With respect to the differences between companies, company LMN had
the greatest reduction in the interest rate premium in both experiments,
and that was significantly different from either ABC or XYZ. The
adjustments made to interest rate premiums for ABC and XYZ were
significantly different in the first, but not in the second, experi-
ment. An examination of the magnitudes of average DIP suggests that
the significant upward adjustment of the interest rate premium for
ABC as compared to XYZ in the first experiment (when a qualified
opinion was issued) was not observed in the second experiment (when
a clean opinion was issued). Changes in the interest rate premiums
for ABC under the two conditions are discussed below.
The results of testing interest rate differences for individual
companies (for both between and within experiments) are presented in
Tables 3 and 4. Test results of comparing treatment companies (ABC and
XYZ) versus the control company (LMN) are reported in Table 3. As
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Table 1
Results of ANOVA Estimates Assuming
the Portfolio Approach
FACTOR Model Ml M2
Both Ex-
Statistics EX1 EX2 periments
Y = Information F ratio 5.43 6.74 11.96
Effect Probability 0.02 0.01 0.001
C = Company Factor F ratio 9.37 5.52 14.71
Probability 0.001 0.005 0.001
Y*C = Interaction F ratio 2.58 2.09 6.64
Probability 0.08 0.13 0.01
X = Experiment F ratio
Probability
NA NA 3.96
0.06
Model F ratio 5.87 4.34 9.06
Probability of signi f icance 0.001 0.001 0.001
Degrees of Freedom (5,197) (5,185) (6,377)
N.A. = Not applicable.
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Table 2
Duncan Multiple Range Tests for
Testing Differences Between Levels of Factors
No. of Test
Exp. Factor Period obser. Mean S.D. grouping* Rank
1 Y = 2 99 0.0202 0.222 A 1
information 3 99 -0.058 0.271 B 2
C = ABC 66 0.068 0.268 A 1
company XYZ 66 -0.0152 0.23 B 2
LMN 66 -0.11 0.23 C 3
2 Y = 2 93 -0.022 0.226 A 1
information 3 93 -0.108 0.248 B 2
C = ABC 62 -0.008 0.23 A 1
company XYZ 62 -0.044 0.27 A 2
LMN 62 -0.1411 0.18 B 3
Note: *Same letter within each category means not significantly different
at p < 0.05. Different letters means statistically significant
at 0.05. Also, the rank refers to signed values of mean DIP.
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shown, only DIP(XYZ - LMN) in year 3 was not statistically significant
(at p \_ 0.05). In all other comparisons, the null was rejected in
favor of the alternative hypotheses at p \ 0.05. As stated earlier,
these findings are consistent with the proposition that the "subject-
to" audit qualification had no decision-effects beyond what is
generated by the loss contingency disclosure.
The following points summarize the results of within company com-
parisons across time that are presented in Table 4:
Insert Tables 3 and 4 here
1. For category A hypotheses, average DIP was significantly negative
(at p < 0.05) for LMN company in the second and third years, and
for XYZ company in Y=3. This finding was obtained consistently
for both experiments.
2. For category B hypotheses, an increase in the interest rate premium
accompanied the disclosure of a contingency and reporting qualified
audit opinion for XYZ only (average DIP was significantly different
from zero at p < 0.05). Although the amounts of contingency and
their relationships to the cash flows of each company were about
the same for ABC and XYZ, bankers evaluated their degree of riski-
ness differently. Based on post-experiment discussions with
bankers, they indicated that income tax assessments have a low
present value because they could take years in the courts to
settle. The threatened legal suit by a client of XYZ company was
perceived to be a source of greater uncertainty than the tax claim.
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Table 3
Test Results of Comparing Adjustments to Risk
Premiums of Treatment Companies Against the Control Company
Diff. in
interest
rate
premium
Experi-
ment
ABC - LMN XYZ - LMN
Mean t Prob. Mean t Prob.
DIP
2
1 0.15 2.97 0.004 0.16 3.26 0.002
2 0.086 1.97 0.05 0.137 2.38 0.022
DI?
3
1 0.204 2.96 0.004 0.03 0.5 0.60*
2 0.177 2.87 0.006 0.056 0.99 0.32*
*0nly when the contingency of XYZ was resolved did DIP of XYZ company
was not significantly different from DIP of LMN, the control company.
-28-
Table 4
Results of Bivariate Comparisons between
Experiments and Conditions for Each Company
Panel A: Within Company for Each Experiment:
Com-
pany
Exper.
DIP(l) = Y2-Y1 DIP(2) = Y3-Yl
Condition Mean S.E. t Condition Mean S.E. t
ABC El Contin.
Qualified
0.068 0.041 1.65 Cont.
Clean
0.068 0.052 1.3
E2 Contin.
Clean
-0.008 0.038 0.21 Cont.
Clean
-0.008 0.048 0.^17
LMN El No Cont. -0.083 0.03 -2.77* No Cont. -0.136 0.045 -3.0*
E2 Mo Cont. -0.097 0.025 -3.87* No Cont. -0.185 0.038 -4.8*
XYZ El Contin.
Qualified 0.076 0.038 1.97*
No Cont.
Clean -0.106 0.036 -2.9*
E2 Contin.
Split Opin. 0.04 0.052 0.7
No Cont.
Clean -0.13 0.042 -3.1*
Panel B: B etween Experiments, El - E2, for Eac h Company
Statistics DIP Y2 - Yl DIP Y3 - Yl
ABC
LMN
XYZ
Horn, of Var.
Test of Dif.
Horn, of Var.
Test of Dif.
Horn, of Var.
Test of Dif.
F = 1.28
t = 1.36
F = 1.54
t = 0.34
F = 1.72
t = 0.54
F = 1.24
t = 1.07
F = 1.46
t = 0.83
F = 1.24
t = 0.41
__ - - - -i . ,i i . —
icates statistical significance below the 0.05 level
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3. For category C hypotheses, the inclusion of contingencies as manage-
ment notes alone did not lead bankers to make a significant upward
adjustment in the interest rate premiums. This was evidenced by
the lack of significant difference of average DIP from zero for ABC
in the second and third year of the second experiment, and in the
third year of the first experiment.
4. The reporting of a split opinion, category D hypothesis, was evalu-
ated by bankers at about the same level at which they evaluated the
disclosure of a contingency by a management note only; average DIP
was not significantly different from zero.
The combined evidence for comparison against the control company
and within company suggests that decision-effects of the audit qualifi-
cation was material. Such a conclusion could be supported further when
average DIP for each company were compared between the two experiments.
As shown in Panel B of Table 4, average DIP were higher, but not signi-
ficantly so for (a) ABC between experiment 1 (qualified report) and
experiment 2 (footnote only), and (b) for XYZ between experiment 1
(qualified opinion) and experiment 2 (split opinion). For both cate-
gory B and C, in both experiments, average DIP were not significantly
different from zero. This finding leads to two implications:
(a) The evidence in Table 3 suggest that existence of contingencies
generated penalties in the form of foregone opportunities by not
lowering the interest rate premiums as time to maturity gets
shorter (as was the case for the LMN company throughout, or for
XYZ when the contingency was removed in the third year.
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(b) Adding a subject-Co audit qualification led to an increase in the
interest rate premium, but not by an amount sufficient to make on
average a significant difference.
VI. THE DEBRIEFING
At the end of each experiment, bankers were asked to complete a
debriefing questionnaire. The objective of the debriefing was to
obtain bankers' views in a direct elicitation mode. The first question
requested a list of the most important pieces of information they think
they used. A categorization of responses by frequency of mention show
profitability, liquidity and solvency as the most frequent. Audit opi-
nion and contingent liabilities were the least frequently mentioned.
Next, subjects were asked to "...allocate a total of 100 points to
six factors in terms of their significance in their decisions." These
factors and a summary of the responses are presented in Table 5. Three
observations apply: First, there is a remarkable similarity between
the two experiments in terms of the levels of means and the ranking of
each factor. Second, in both experiments, profit history and cash flow
were ranked either first or second, with a combined weight of 43%.
Third, audit opinion was ranked sixth in both experiments with an
average weight of about 9%, which is lower than the 12% weight assigned
to footnote disclosure.
Insert Table 5 here
Since the subjects were Canadian bankers, they were asked to
indicate their opinion about the effects of the CICA's cancelling of
the subject-to opinion. Bankers rated about "average" the effect of
-31-
Table 5
A Summary of The Bankers' Own Assigned
Weights to Several Key Factors in Financial
Analysis of A Borrower's Financial Position
Factor First Exper. Second Exper.
Mean S.D. C.V.* Rank**
l=highest
Mean S.D.* C.V. Rank**
l=highest
Footnote
Disclosure
Ratio Analysis
Audit Opinion
Profit History
Cash Flow
Capital
12.03
19.8
9.5
21.0
21.3
16.27
6.0
8.5
4.3
6.6
9.37
7.5
0.5
0.43
0.45
0.31
0.43
0.46
5
3
6
1
2
4
12.7
15.0
9.0
21.2
22.5
20.3
7.5
8.7
5.7
6.4
11.2
8.85
0.6
0.6
0.63
0.4
0.5
0.44
5
4
6
2
1
3
Total 100.0 — — — 100.0
Note: At the end of both experiments bankers were asked to allocate 100
points to the "following factors in terms of their significance in
your decision making."
*C.V. is the coefficient of variation.
**Rank is a decreasing rank for the mean, and an increasing rank for
the C.V., the coefficient of variation.
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that action on the degree "to which auditors communicate uncertainty."
On a five-point scale (high=5, and low=l), average scores were 3.34 and
3.45 for the two experiments. However, when asked if, as a consequence,
they were led to underestimate the risk arising from contingencies,
their answers indicated a small effect (the average scores were 2.63
and 2.77 for both experiments).
Finally, in response to a question on their adaptation to can-
celling the "subject-to" qualification, two important features were
indicated: (a) forty-one responded that they place more emphasis on
future projections and on the thoroughness of financial analysis,
including comparisons with industry numbers; and (b) thirty-three re-
sponses indicated that adaptation took place by seeking substitute
information from management for increased assurance.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study presents the results of two experiments in which 64
experienced commercial bank loan officers analyzed financial statements
and made a sequence of judgments about three companies that were faced
with varying degrees of contingencies. The form in which the loss con-
tingency was communicated to the bankers varied between management
disclosure only, management disclosure accompanied by a qualified audit
opinion, and management disclosure accompanied by a clean opinion for
Canadian stockholders but a qualified opinion only for the U.S. stock-
holders. Furthermore, the degree of uncertainty embedded in the con-
tingency varied; the uncertainty was presumed to be higher in the case
of litigation by clients than in the case of litigation for income tax
assessment differences. Finally, the simulated time sequence permitted
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the researchers to vary the resolution of those uncertainties; in one
case a low cost settlement was reached, while in the other case the
loss contingency continued.
Bankers made several types of judgments. The most important
measure was the interest rate premium to be charged above the pre-
vailing prime rate. The loan contract provided that such a premium
should be adjusted once a year based on the company's performance in
that year. Performance in this case extended beyond the financial
operations to include contingent claims and the form in which they were
communicated. The other two measures consisted of categorical rating
of the debt-paying ability and of the probability of default.
Analysis of the judgments made by loan officers revealed the follow-
ing:
1. The disclosure (or the lack thereof) of a contingency, and not the
qualification of audit reports, was the important factor affecting
judgments about uncertainty. This is reflected in the changes in
the variable interest rate premiums (especially when compared
against the control company) and in the categorical assessment of
both the debt-paying ability and the probability of default.
2. With one exception, the increase in the levels of interest rate
premiums when a subject-to qualification was reported was not
significantly different from the levels of interest rate premiums
for the same company (or companies) in the absence of audit report
qualification.
3. When contingencies were cleared, bankers took notice of that and
significantly reduced the required interest rate premium such that
it was not on average different from that of the control company.
-34-
4. All these results were further confirmed by the analysis of the
changes in the categorical assignment of the debt-paying ability
and of the assessment of the probability of default.
5. Finally, bankers reported that they do not believe the "audit
opinion" is a very important determinant in their evaluation of the
client's uncertainty. Out of six factors, the audit opinion was
rated last, with an average importance weight of 9%, whereas
profit history and cash flow analysis had an average importance
weight of 43%, and management footnote disclosure had an average
of 12%.
These findings are consistent with the thrust of Libby's results
(1979). Consistency of the findings is particularly important since
the present study provided a much more complex experimental design for
two different experiments, conducted the experiment on a one-to-one
basis with subjects, controlled the flow of new information such that
it coincides with sequencing of the judgments made, and avoided the
methodological problems raised by Berthold (1979) and Schultz (1979)
about Libbv's research design.
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Footnotes
1. By "split opinion" we refer to a situation in which the auditor
reports an unqualified opinion for the Canadian Stockholders but,
immediately below it, provides comments addressed to U.S. readers
which, in effect, reports a subject-to qualification in accordance
with U.S. reporting standards. This reporting conflict is dealt
with in an Auditing Guideline dated April, 1981, "Canada-United
States Reporting Conflict with Respect to Contingencies and Going
Concern Considerations Contained in the CICA Handbook.—See
Appendix—for an illustration. See Appendix A for an example.
Another case was Banister Construction Limited, for 1981.
2. Banks and Kinney (1982) present a concise summary of accounting
and auditing standards for loss contingencies.
3. The Report of the Commission on Auditor's Responsibility refers
(p. 27) to the cases of Herfeld v. Lyenthaol Krekstein Horwath &
Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (CCH Fed. Sec. L Reptr.
paragraph 94,574); and Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 476 F.2d 687, 697 (2d Cir.
,
1973) (CCH Fed. Sec. L. Reptr. Paragraph 93,814).
4. A number of empirical studies have used security price methodology
in attempting to assess the information content of subject-to
qualifications. See Bailey (1982) for a critique of this method-
ology and for a suggested research design. Our approach is con-
sistent with Bailey's suggestion.
5. In addition to the reasons cited in the text, Canadian commercial
bank loan officers have not over studied as in the case of the
U.S. bankers. Hence, they were more involved in the task con-
stituting the experiment.
6. The results of these tests were consistent with those obtained for
the interest rate premium. They were deleted from this text in
order to reduce redundancy.
D/234A
REFERENCES
AICPA (1974), Statements of Auditing Standards, No. 2: Report on
Audited Financial Statements (New York: AICPA, 1974).
AICPA (1978), Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities: Report
,
Conclusions, and Recommendations (New York: AICPA, 1978).
Alderman, C. Wayne (1977), "Role of Uncertainty Qualifications:
Evidence to Support the Tentative Conclusions of the Cohen
Commission," Journal of Accountancy (November 1977), Vol. 144,
pp. 97-100.
Alderman, C. Wayne (1979), "Empirical Analysis of the Impact of
Uncertainty Qualifications on the Market Risk Components,"
Accounting and Business Research (Autumn 1979), Vol. 9, pp. 258-266.
Anderson, R. J. (1977), The External Audit (Toronto, Canada: Copp
Clark Pitman Co., 1977).
ASB Public Meeting on 'Subject-to' Opinion (News Report), Journal of
Accountancy (August 1982), pp. 10-14.
ASB task force to recommend if subject-to should be kept. (News
report), Journal of Accountancy
,
(September 1982), Vol. 154,
pp. 9-10.
Auditing, Proposed SAS on Contingencies, The Journal of Accountancy
,
(December 1977).
Bailey, W. T., "An Appraisal of Research Designs Used to Investigate
the Information Content of Audit Reports," The Accounting Review
(January 1982).
Ball, R., R. G. Walker, and G. P. Whittred, "Audit Qualifications and
Share Prices," Abacus (June 1979), pp. 23-34.
Banks, D. W. and W. R. Kinney, Jr., "Loss Contingency Reports and Stock
Prices: An Empirical Study," Journal of Accounting Research
,
(Spring 1982), Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 240-54.
Beach, L. R. , T. R. Mitchell, M. D. Deaton, and J. Prontero (1978),
"Information Relevance, Content and Source Credibility in the
Revision of Opinions," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance
(February 1978), pp. 1-16.
Bertholdt, Richard H. (1979), "Discussion of the Impact of Uncertainty
Reporting on the Loan Decision," Studies on Auditing—Selections
from the "Research Opportunities in Auditing" Program . A supple-
ment to Journal of Accounting Research , Vol. 17, 1979, pp. 58-63.
Bettman, J. R. (1979), An Information Processing Theory of Consumer
Choice (Boston, Add! son-Wesley, 1979).
Box, G. E., W. G. Hunter, and J. S. Hunter (1978), Statistics for
Experimenters: An Introduction to Design DATA ANALYSIS and Model
Building (N.Y.: Wiley & Sons, 1978).
Carmichael, D. R. (1976), "Risk and Uncertainty in Financial Reporting
and the Auditor's Role," Auditing Symposium III (Howard Problems,
University of Kansas), 1976, pp. 32-44.
Carmichael, D. R., "An Analysis of Research on 'Subject to' Opinions,"
"The Accounting Establishment" in Perspective—Proceedings of the
Arthur Young Professors' Roundtable 1978
,
(Arthur Young & Company,
1979), pp. 19-25.
Carmichael, Jane, "Needed: how-to for subject to" (Numbers game),
Forbes (August 16, 1982), Vol. 130, p. 93.
Chow, Chee W. and Steven J. Rice, "Qualified Audit Opinions and Auditor
Switching," (Notes), Accounting Review (April 1982), Vol. 57,
pp. 326-35.
Dillard, J. F. , R. J. Murdock, and J. K. Shank (1978), "CPA's Attitudes
Towards 'Subject to' Opinions," CPA Journal (August 1978), pp. 43-47.
Elliott, John A., "'Subject to' Audit Opinions and Abnormal Security
Returns—Outcomes and Ambiguities," Journal of Accounting Research
(Autumn 1982), Vol 20, Part 2, pp. 617-38.
FASB (1975), Statement of Accounting Standards No. 5: Accounting for
Contingencies (Stamford, CT: FASB, 1975).
Firth, M. , "Qualified Audit Reports: Their Impact on Investment
Decisions," The Accounting Review (July 1978), pp. 642-50.
Hicks, Margeret, Study of Alternative Auditor's Reports and Lending
Behavior
,
(College Park, Md.), 1982. 138 typewritten pages.
(Thesis DBA—University of Maryland).
Jefferys, Donald E. (1980), "New and Proposed Auditing Recommendations,"
C A Magazine (September 1980), pp. 60-64.
Kida, T. (1980), "An Investigation into Auditor's Continuity and Related
Qualification Judgments," Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn
1980), pp. 506-523.
Libby, Robert (1979), "Bankers' and Auditors' Perceptions of the Message
Communicated by the Audit Report," Journal of Accounting Research
(Spring 1979), pp. 99-122.
Opportunitie s in Auditing" Program TT T =—^esearcn
Accounting Reseat „„?» ifffffj pp\ aS^T " ^""^ °f-
N'° rb
I; 3
!
;'
1\Ua: °- (w 8) '
"
SubjeCt t0 Audltor Opinions," FinancialAnalysts Journal (May-June 1978), Vol. 34, pp. 18-io.
Pany Kurt and Ralph Smith (1979), "What Does 'Subject to' Mean in an
voir62i
p
p"3i-:ralofCommprHaiR^ T^^ <~« Sts"
^"Lard^S
J
K*
F
*
D1
l
lard ^ R * J * Murd°ck > '*How financial Executives
pp f 28-35?
'
Opinions," Financial Exem rlvp (November 1979
^
Thornton Daniel b. The Financial Reporting of Contingenc^e^ndUncertainties. Theory and Practice Thl clnldiln CeTHflel GeneralAccountants* Research Foundation, 1983.
The Wall Street Journal, "Auditors' Group Proposes to End Practice ofIssuing Qualifications in Audit Letter," (November 4, 1977)'
Whit
Ann
d,
i
G
;
P
" "^^ Qualificat i°ns and the Timeliness of Corporateual Reports," The Accounting Review (October 1980), pp. 563-77?
Whit
nn
e
^
G
'-
P
r'T
'
'"
Accountant G r°"P Shelves Eliminating Warning Signalo Firms* Uncertainties" (July 20, 1978).
s
Whittred, G. P. "Lending Officers* Attitudes Toward 'Shelter to' Auditp£™^ The Journal of Commercial Ban. Lending (March 1978
)
Whittred G. P., "what Do 'Subject to' Auditors' Opinions Mean to
PpHl-Is
Financial Analysts Journal (January/February 1979),
ivlli" r
ntf ?: *'* 7he Inf<™tion Content of Unusual UncertaintyReport,. An Empirical Study," Working Paper, Washington University,
Appendix A
A Case of 'Split' Audit Opinion
Faclonbridge Nickel Mines Limited (1981).
AUDITORS' REPORT
To the Shareholder of Falconbridge Nickel Mines Limited:
We have examined the following financial statements of Falconbridge
Nickel Mines Limited:
Consolidated financial position as at December 31, 1981 and 1980;
Consolidated earnings, consolidated retained earnings and changes
in consolidated financial position for the three years ended
December 31, 1981;
Segmneted information as at December 31, 1981, 1980 and 1979 and
for the three years ended December 31, 1981; and
Investment in associated and other companies as at December 13,
1981, 1980 and 1979 and for the three years ended December 31,
1981.
Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards, and accordingly included such tests and other procedures as
we considered necessary in the circumstances.
In our opinion, the above-mentioned financial statements present fairly
the financial position of the company, the results of its operations
and the changes in its financial position at the dates and for the
periods indicated in accordance with accounting principles generally
accepted in Canada, consistently applied.
Clarkson Gordon
Toronto, Canada, January 29, 1982. Chartered Accountants
COMMENT ON DIFFERENCES IN
CANADIAN-UNITED STATES REPORTING STANDARDS FOR AUDITORS
In the United States, reporting standards for auditors require the
expression of an opinion qualified as being subject to the outcome of
significant uncertainties affecting the financial statements such as
the uncertainty referred to in the attached statement of consolidated
financial position as at December 31, 1981 and as describe din note
7(b) relating to Falconbridge Dominicana, C. por A., page 33, of the
notes to consolidated financial statements. The opinion in our above
report is expressed in accordance with Canadian standards and is not
qualified with respect to, and provides no reference to, this uncer-
tainty since such an opinion would not be in accordance with Canadian
reporting standards for auditors when the uncertainties are adequately
disclosed in the finanical statements. A Canadian-United States
reporting conflict did not exist in 1980.
Clarkson Gordon
Toronto, Canada, January 29, 1982 Chartered Accountants
Appendix B
A Condensed Profile of the Three CompaniesDuring the Year of Granting the Loan
(Year 1)
Ratios
ABC LMN XYZ
Quick Ratio
Current Ratio
Total Debt/Net Worth
Net Worth/Net Plant
Days Sales in Receivables
Sales to Net Plant
Gross Margin to Sales
Net Income/Net Worth
Net Income/Sales
0.56
1.54
1.46
0.99
45
3.94
0.17
0.09
0.02
0.56
1.37
1.92
0.84
44
4.43
0.18
0.12
0.02
0.96
1.96
1.25
0.89
62
3.05
0.19
0.08
0.02
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